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A Test of Competing Explanations of Compensation Demanded 
The disparity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept, also known as compensation demanded, is a robust 
experimental finding. Two types of explanations been proposed. 
The first invokes psychological effects, broadly categorized as 
reference dependence and loss aversion. The second explanation is 
that there are large substitution effects but that underlying behavior 
is neoclassically utility-theoretic. The key observation motivating 
the present study is that loss aversion implies concavity of 
willingness to accept, whereas the utility-theoretic explanation 
implies convexity.  
We report experiments in which subjects were endowed with 3 
items and asked the minimum payments they required to be willing 
to relinquish 1, 2, or 3 of them. We examine whether the 
compensation demanded is convex, concave, neither, or both in the 
number of items being relinquished. 
  
1. Introduction 
The disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, also known as 
compensation demanded, is one of the most widely studied and robust experimental 
findings. A typical experiment consists of the following: A person is given an 
ordinary flashlight and then offered money to return it to the experimenter. The dollar 
amount the subject asks for is his compensation demanded (CD). Another person is 
not given a flashlight and instead is asked to pay for one. The dollar amount the 
subject offers is his willingness-to-pay (WTP). CD is usually substantially higher than 
WTP, by a factor of two to six times, and this disparity has been shown to occur in a 
variety of settings and for a wide variety of goods, including public goods. (See 
reviews in Fisher, McClelland, and Schulze; Horowitz and McConnell; Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler.)  
Two types of explanations have been proposed for this disparity. The first invokes 
psychological effects of the valuation process, broadly categorized as reference 
dependence and loss aversion. The second explanation is that the phenomenon arises 
from neoclassical utility-theoretic behavior. Analysts such as Shogren et al. have 
interpreted the disparity as evidence of large substitution effects, based on results 
from Hanemann.  
The key observation motivating the present study is that the psychological 
explanation implies concavity of compensation demanded, whereas the utility-
theoretic explanation implies convexity. This permits a test of the competing 
hypotheses. Note that experiments to look at the curvature of WTP cannot distinguish 
between loss aversion and utility-theoretic explanations since both theories predict 
WTP will be concave. 
The prediction of convexity of CD from standard consumer theory follows from 
quasi-concavity of preferences and is a manifestation of an increasing marginal rate of 
substitution between money and the good. The prediction from the psychological 
model is more difficult to derive because the behavioral implications are less sharply 
specified. The general idea is that individuals are most sensitive to whether they are to 
receive a gain or a loss of some good and relatively insensitive to the amount of gain 
or loss, contingent on facing one or the other. Such behavior will result in CD being 
concave. 
The two models have very different implications for welfare economics, especially for 
contingent valuation and environmental policy. Concavity in the loss domain has an 
especially compelling implication for environmental policy. Sharp concavity suggests 
that if it were certain that at least some level of environmental deterioration was going 
to take place, then people would be relatively indifferent to how drastic this 
deterioration was; people may no longer care much about the environment at all. This 
contrasts with the neoclassical view, which predicts that people will be increasingly 
concerned as any predicted environmental deterioration rises.  
This paper tests the competing hypotheses using multiple-item, private-good 
experiments. In a typical experiment, each subject was endowed with 3 units of a 
good and asked the minimum payments he required to be willing to relinquish 1, 2, or 
3 of them. We examine whether the compensation demanded is convex, concave, 
neither, or both in the number of goods relinquished. The multiple-item experiments 
also allow us to vary the endowment. We test whether compensation demanded is 
increasing in the endowment. 
Only a few previous studies have measured CD and even fewer have used the 
multiple goods that are needed to observe its curvature and test the competing 
explanations. Those studies are reviewed in Section 6. Because the WTP-CD disparity 
has been thoroughly and, we feel, convincingly established, the current paper does not 
elicit WTP. 
2. Two Behavioral Models 
A. Utility-Theoretic 
Utility is defined over a good q, whose quantity is controlled by the experimenter, and 
a vector of other goods, x, available at price p. Write utility as u(q,x). Define uq = as 
the maximum of u(q,x) over x subject to p x = M where M is the individual’s 
income; we suppress the arguments p and M. Let the corresponding expenditure 
function be m(q,u). Compensation demanded for a change in q from a, the endowed 
point, to b is m(b,ua) - m(a,ua). If a > b then m(b,ua) - m(a,ua) > 0. Strict convexity of 
the expenditure function in q is implied by strict quasi-concavity of utility (Maler).  
Consider an individual endowed with three identical flashlights who is asked the 
minimum payments he requires to relinquish 1, 2, or 3 of them. His utility at the start 
of the experiment is u3. The compensation demanded for 1 flashlight is m(2,u3) - 
m(3,u3). More generally, let CDik = m(k-i,uk) - m(k,uk) be the compensation 
demanded to surrender i units of a good when k is the endowment; the first superscript 
represents the amount of the good the individual is asked to surrender, not the amount 
he will have after the transaction. Thus, the compensation demanded for 2 and 3 
flashlights is CD23 = m(1,u3) - m(3,u3) and CD33 = m(0,u3) - m(3,u3). Because the 
expenditure function is strictly convex in q, compensation demanded will also be 
strictly convex in i. In words, the compensation demanded to give up the second 
flashlight exceeds the compensation demanded to give up the first one. 
Strict convexity and CD0k = 0 imply the following four inequalities: 
(i) CD2k - 2CD1k > 0 
(ii) CD3k - 3CD1k > 0 
(iii) 2CD3k - 3CD2k > 0 
(iv) CD1k + CD3k - 2CD2k > 0 
Economists may also be interested in how compensation demanded changes with the 
endowment. The relevant derivative is dCDik/dk and it obeys sign(dCDik/dk) = -
sign[m11 - m12(m1/m2)], so long as this expression is everywhere uniformly signed. 
Subscripts represent partial derivatives. In words, the endowment effect depends on 
how having more of the rationed good changes both the marginal value of the good, 
represented by m11, and the marginal utility of money (i.e., 1/m2), represented by m12. 
Convexity of the expenditure function implies m11 > 0 and a positive CD-WTP 
difference implies m12 < 0. Note that m1 < 0 and m2 > 0. 
Thus, the neoclassical model provides no prediction of how compensation demanded 
changes with the endowment. Our experiments appear to yield m11  0, which, in 
conjunction with CD greater than WTP, implies dCDik/dk > 0. This implies that the 
compensation demanded for giving up i flashlights will be higher when the 
endowment is 3 than when the endowment is 2.  
The general expectation among economists, however, is that the value of any given 
number of flashlight will fall as the individual has more flashlights. In this case, 
compensation demanded for giving up i flashlights will fall as the endowment 
increases, or dCDik/dk < 0. This expectation, it may be interesting to note, is 
consistent with a small CD-WTP difference (m12  0) and strictly convex 
compensation demanded (m11 > 0). The predicted inequality is: 
(v) CDij - CDik > 0  k > j. 
B. Psychological Model 
The prevailing psychological model of economic decision-making is a value function 
which is: (a) defined on deviations from a reference point; (b) convex for losses and 
concave for gains; and (c) steeper for losses than gains (Kahneman and Tversky). The 
principle underlying convexity in losses is that the individual cares about losing per se 
and further that, conditional on knowing that he faces a loss, the individual is 
relatively insensitive to the magnitude of that loss. Convexity of the loss value 
function implies concavity of CDik in i for i > 0. If concavity is strict, the 
psychological model implies the following four inequalities: 
(i ) CD2k - 2CD1k < 0  
(ii ) CD3k - 3CD1k < 0  
(iii ) 2CD3k - 3CD2k < 0  
(iv ) CD1k + CD3k - 2CD2k < 0  
The literature’s support for strict convexity of the loss value function is not 
unequivocal. Kahneman and Tversky claim only that the value function is 
"commonly" convex for losses (p. 279). The evidence for strict convexity appears to 
come exclusively from experiments involving risky choice, which show that a 
majority of subjects are risk-seeking in gambles involving only losses. (See 
Kahneman and Tversky and their references).  
Concavity of CD and the "steeper for losses than gains" property are logically distinct 
but neither is well defined if property (a) is not satisfied. Evidence for loss aversion 
has therefore been interpreted in the literature as evidence of reference dependence. 
However, distinctions between the two models based either on loss aversion or 
reference dependence are difficult to make, since there have not been clear testable 
hypotheses based on these principles. 
There have therefore also been no clear hypotheses about how compensation 
demanded changes with the endowment. The following interpretation seems 
consistent with the psychological model. If consumption bundles are evaluated only 
as gains or losses, then changes in the endowment should have no effect on the value 
of any given loss. This implies the equality: 
(v ) CDij - CDik = 0  j, k. 
3. Research Method 
Thirteen experiments were conducted in-person with small subject groups. The 
difference between our experiments and previous experiments is that respondents 
were endowed with multiple items. The items were mugs, flashlights, and binoculars 
(Table 1).  
For example, in Experiment 8 each subject started out with one ceramic mug, three 
flashlights, and a complete copy of the survey. We first asked subjects to value the 
mug. Each participant was asked to write down the minimum payment he or she 
would require to be willing to sell the mug back to us; this is his compensation 
demanded. We then repeated the following procedure several times, first for practice 
and then for real money and a real transaction: The administrator drew an offer price 
randomly out of an envelope. If the subject's compensation demanded was higher than 
the offer price, the subject kept his mug. If his compensation demanded was less than 
or equal to the offer price, he returned his mug to us and received a check for the 
randomly drawn price. All subjects were offered the same offer price. Under this 
method, subjects will report true compensation demanded if they are expected utility 
maximizers (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak).  
In the second part of Experiment 8, each subject wrote down three numbers: the 
minimum payments he or she required to be willing to sell us back one, two, and three 
flashlights. We then randomly drew a piece of paper that stated the number of 
flashlights (per person) we would actually be buying back, and a second piece of 
paper that stated the offer price. For example, we might randomly draw the instruction 
to buy back two of each subject’s three flashlights, and then draw an offer price of 
$8.00. This is a price for the two flashlights, not a per-flashlight price. All subjects 
who had offered to sell two flashlights for $8.00 or less then turned in two flashlights 
and received a check for $8.00. They kept their remaining flashlight. All subjects who 
had offered to sell two flashlights for more than $8.00 kept all three flashlights and 
received no money.  
Subjects were not told the distribution of offer prices. Once the number of flashlights 
at stake was chosen, the offer-price mechanism was the same as for the single mug, 
except that this part of the experiment was conducted only once, for real money and a 
real transaction. The responses allow us to test whether the compensation demanded 
was convex, concave, neither, or both in the number of items.  
The experiments differed in the number and kind of items the subjects were given as 
an endowment and how many of those items the subject was asked to consider selling. 
Experiments 1 through 5 did not have an initial one-item experiment.  
Subjects for Experiment 1 were undergraduates. Subjects for Experiments 2 through 
13 were members of local civic groups. In return for participation, the sponsoring 
group was paid $20 per subject. The mugs/flashlight/binoculars and CD payments 
went directly to the subjects. Using local civic groups allows us to survey at low cost 
a relatively large number of subjects that is more representative of the U.S. population 
than other commonly surveyed groups such as students. The cost per response is 
considerably less than an in-person survey of a more rigorously selected sample. The 
sacrifice is that the groups are not representative samples of the U.S. population. 
4. Results  
A. Tests for Convexity and Concavity  
The behavioral hypotheses can be applied to both aggregate and individual behavior. 
For aggregate behavior, we need look only at sample means. For individual behavior, 
we look at the proportion of subjects who exhibit the predicted patterns.  
Table 2 gives means for the flashlights and mugs. The means (standard errors) for 
binoculars (k=3) were $46.88 (9.71) for i=2 and $72.66 (15.0) for i=3. For aggregate 
behavior, there are thirteen tests of conditions (i) through (iv) (4 at k=3 and 4 at k=4 
for mugs; 4 at k=3 for flashlights; 1 for binoculars). Nine of the expressions are 
positive. None is significantly different from zero at the 95% level for a two-sided 
test. Thus, aggregate behavior is roughly linear. It is neither demonstrably loss averse 
nor utility-theoretic. 
Closeness to linearity is also true of individual observations. Thirty-three percent of 
the set of three- and four-mug endowments observations were exactly linear. For 
binoculars, 50 percent of the responses were exactly linear.  
The proportions of individual responses that are strictly convex or concave are shown 
in Tables 3 through 6 for mugs and flashlights. (For binoculars, 37.5 percent of the 
responses were convex and 12.5 percent were concave.) Of the eight single condition 
tests for mugs and flashlights (Tables 3 and 4), six show a higher proportion of 
concave (loss averse) responses than convex, and two show a higher proportion of 
convex (utility-theoretic) responses. Tables 5 and 6 show two three-condition tests 
and two four-condition tests. Three of the four tests demonstrate a higher proportion 
to be strictly concave than strictly convex. In total, ten of the 12 comparisons show 
more concavity than convexity.  
Next we examine where these proportions are significantly different from zero. Of the 
12 comparisons, six have a significantly higher (at the 90% level of confidence) 
proportion of concave responses, and one significantly higher convex response. 
Again, concavity appears more prevalent than convexity.  
Number of Items. The three proportions which are significantly concave for mugs are i 
and i-iii. For flashlights the significant proportions of concavity are i, ii, and i-iii. The 
test for condition iv, comparing the curvature for one, two and three items, is convex 
for mugs. Both goods show concavity where the value of one and two items is 
compared (condition i). This test is closest to the origin, and most similar to previous 
tests in the literature which have found concavity. The one test available for 
binoculars comparing the value of two versus three (condition iii) shows a larger 
proportion to be convex.  
In summary, concavity (loss aversion) is more prevalent than convexity (utility-
theoretic). Behavior becomes more utility-theoretic when more items (2 or 3) are 
involved. 
  
Table 2 
Mean Compensation Demanded for Mugs and 
Flashlights, by Endowment 
Endowment, k   
Mugs Flashlights 
Number of 
Items  
Relinquished, 
i  
1 3 4 1 3 
1 $5.07a 
(.30)b 
188c 
$3.61 
(.35) 
65 
$3.46 
(.40) 
60 
$6.38
(.67) 
38 
$5.40 
(.48) 
58 
2 -- $8.65 
(.82) 
128 
$6.82 
(.76) 
60 
-- $9.38 
(.88) 
133 
3 -- $13.54
(1.60) 
128 
$10.50 
(1.15) 
60 
-- $14.96 
(1.63) 
133 
aThe first entry is the mean. bThe second entry is the 
standard error. cThe third entry is the number of 
observations 
Table 3 
Single Condition Tests for Convexity 
  Mugs Flashlights 
Quantity Mean Proportion 
Positive 
Mean Proportion 
Positive 
CD2k — 2CD1k  $.47a 
(.81)b 
125c 
.22 -$.60 
(.34) 
58 
.14 
CD3k - 3CD1k $1.45 
(1.61) 
125 
.30 -$.61 
(.72) 
58 
.26 
2CD3k - 3CD2k $.94 
(.61) 
188 
.24 $2.39 
(1.05) 
124 
.33 
CD1k + CD3k - 
2CD2k  
$.51 
(.21) 
125 
.36 $.61 
(.67) 
58 
.31 
aThe first entry is the mean. bThe second entry is the standard error. 
cThe third entry is the number of observations pertaining to that cell and 
the reported proportions. 
  
  
Table 4 
Single Condition Tests for Concavity 
  Proportion Negativea 
Quantity Mugs Flashlights 
CD2k — 2CD1k .38 
125b 
.45 
58 
CD3k — 3CD1k .37 
125 
.46 
58 
2CD3k - 3CD2k .31 
188 
.28 
124 
CD1k + CD3k - 
2CD2k 
.22 
125 
.29 
58 
aThe means are the same as Table 3. bThe second 
entry is the number of observations. 
  
Table 5 
Joint Tests for Convexity 
Proportion of cases 
where the following 
relations hold with 
strict inequality 
  
Mugs 
  
Flashlights 
(i), (ii) and (iii) hold .12 
125a 
.07 
58 
(i),(ii), (iii), and (iv) 
hold 
.10 
125 
.07 
58 
aThe second entry is the number of observations 
pertaining to the test. 
Item Value. Neither model 
predicts unequivocally how 
concavity will change as the 
value of the individual items 
increases. For the utility-
theoretic model, consider the 
indirect utility function V(q,M) 
= eαqM. A higher-value item is 
represented by a higher  . 
Compensation demanded is 
CDik = (e i-1)M, which 
becomes more convex in i as  
rises. The difference 2CD3k - 
3CD2k is equal to (2e3 -3e2 
+1)M. Thus, this utility-
theoretic model predicts 2CD3k 
- 3CD2k will be increasing in 
item value. The psychological 
model does not have a 
prediction to our knowledge.  
Experiments were conducted with mugs (which cost us $4), flashlights ($6) and 
binoculars ($25). In Experiment 12, 50 subjects each received 3 pairs of binoculars; 
thus, each began the experiment with an endowment that cost us $75. This is a much 
larger endowment than any that has been previously used in valuation experiments.  
For the binoculars, values for CDi3 were elicited for i = 2 and 3. Ten observations 
were dropped because either CDi3 was decreasing in i or was excessively high (greater 
than $500). Of the 40 remaining observations, 15 were utility-theoretic, 5 were loss-
averse, and 20 were exactly linear. (When i takes only two values, behavior falls in 
exactly one category.) Thus, subjects were three times as likely to exhibit utility-
theoretic behavior as loss-averse. The mean of 2CD3k - 3CD2k was $9.37 with 
standard error of 6.62, excluding linear responses. The positive value shows that 
aggregate behavior was also utility-theoretic. 
Results for all items are in Table 7. The magnitudes and the proportion of positive 
values are increasing as item value increases. The proportion of negative values is 
decreasing. Thus, behavior becomes less loss averse and more utility-theoretic as the 
item value increases.  
Table 7 
Convexity and Concavity as Item Value Increases 
Commodity 2CD3k - 3CD2k 
  Proportion 
negative 
Proportion 
positive 
Meanb 
Table 6 
Joint Tests for Concavity 
Proportion of cases 
where the following 
relations hold with 
strict inequality. 
  
Mugs 
  
Flashlights 
(i ), (ii ), and (iii ) 
hold 
0.22 
128a 
0.31 
58 
(i ), (ii ), (iii ), 
and (iv ) hold 
0.08 
128 
0.16 
58 
aThe second entry is the number of observations 
pertaining to the test. 
Mugs 0.31 
188a 
0.24 $1.30 
(0.74)c 
Flashlights 0.28 
124 
0.33 $3.59 
(1.60) 
Binoculars 0.13 
40 
0.38 $9.37 
(6.62) 
aNumber of observations bLinear responses excluded cStandard 
error 
 
B. Changes in Endowment  
The effects of the endowment can be observed from Table 2. Unlike the previous 
tests, these are between-sample. There are six tests of condition (v), five of which are 
independent. All six of the aggregate differences CDij - CDik are positive for k > j. 
Four of these are statistically significant for a one-sided test at the 90% level. Three of 
the five independent differences are significant. We reject (v ).  
The results show that when subjects start with more items, the value of any individual 
item goes down. This finding, which is perfectly in line with economists’ expectations 
for economic behavior, implies that compensation demanded will be moderately 
convex (utility-theoretic), a result not readily observed in the within-sample tests.  
  
5. Previous Studies 
Only a few previous valuation studies provide information on the concavity or 
convexity of CD. Two studies of environmental goods found CD to be convex, as in 
the utility-theoretic model. A third study of a private good found CD to be concave.  
Brookshire and Coursey elicited WTP and CD for trees a public park in Colorado. 
Two increases in tree numbers (200 trees to 225 or 250) and two decreases (175 and 
150) were used for WTP and CD, respectively. Mansfield used these data to estimate 
WTP and CD functions and found the following results: (a) The intercept for the CD 
regression was significantly different from zero under one specification and 
insignificant under a second. (b) CD was convex. (c) The hypothesis that WTP and 
CD were generated from the same underlying CES utility function was rejected. Note 
that the Brookshire and Coursey data included only two changes in the quantity of the 
good and the good was public, not private. The latter distinction required the surveys 
to include a collective choice mechanism. 
Rowe, d’Arge, and Brookshire elicited CD and WTP for improved visibility in the 
Grand Canyon. CD was convex in the miles of improved visibility. Mean CD was 
$24.46 for a 25 mile decrement, from 75 to 50 miles, and $71.42 for a 50 mile 
decrement, from 75 to 25 miles. WTP was concave ($3.53 for a 25 mile increment, 
from 25 to 50 miles, and $6.54 for a 50 mile increment, from 25 to 75 miles.) 
Loewenstein studied the value of postponing or speeding up the receipt of a $7 gift 
certificate for a local record shop. Compensation Demanded and WTP were both 
concave in the number of weeks of delay and speed-up, respectively. Mean CD to 
delay receipt for 3 extra weeks was $1.09. Mean CD to delay for 7 extra weeks was 
$1.76.  
Other studies have attempted to derive different testable hypotheses for the loss 
aversion and utility-theoretic models. Shogren et al. elicited WTP and CD from 
students for chocolate bars and sandwiches that had a possibility of bacterial 
contamination. They found a small CD-WTP disparity for the former items and a 
much larger disparity for the latter. They attributed the difference between the goods 
to a utility-theoretic effect arising from the lack of close substitutes for risk of food-
borne pathogens. Differences in the availability of substitutes is a maintained 
assumption that cannot be tested separately utility-theoretic behavior. The 
psychological model suffers from not being well specified for such choices because it 
does not specify how loss aversion should vary across goods.  
Bateman et al. elicited WTP and CD for chocolate, soft drinks, and money and 
showed that the purported reference point affects the elicited values. Again, the 
psychological model suffers from not being well specified; in their case, about what 
the reference point will be. 
6. Summary 
Our results show behavior that is not clearly loss averse or utility-theoretic. Utility-
theoretic behavior is evinced in three ways: (1) As the item value increases, behavior 
is more utility-theoretic. (2) As more units are surrendered from a given endowment, 
behavior is more utility-theoretic. In other words, as one moves "farther from the 
origin," behavior is more utility-theoretic. (3) In the between-sample comparison of 
different endowments, behavior is clearly utility-theoretic.  
We see this study as weakly favoring the utility model over the psychological model. 
We have four reasons. First, in-sample tests of concavity/convexity are consistent 
with both models and the edge for loss aversion is only slight. Second, between-
sample tests of changing endowments are clearly utility-theoretic. Third, findings (1) 
and (2) from above show that as greater changes are at stake, behavior conforms more 
closely to the utility model. They suggest that neoclassical behavior would likely be 
observed in the multiple-item, high-stakes real world.  
Fourth, the utility model did not fail. Previous studies have led to the impression that 
utility models will suffer miserably in comparison to psychological models whenever 
behavior on such a small scale is being investigated. For example, KKT conclude that 
"the evidence reported [in their paper] offers no support for the contention that 
observations of loss aversion and the consequential evaluation disparities are 
artifacts… Instead the findings support an alternative view of endowment effects and 
loss aversion as fundamental characteristics of preferences" (p. 1346). In this context, 
the fact that the utility model did not dramatically fail for us must be seen as a victory. 
Further tests would be aided by having more concrete predictions from the two 
models. Consider the interpretation of changes in the endowment. In our between-
sample tests of endowment changes, behavior conforms closely to economists’ 
expectations. This appears to be particularly strong evidence against the psychological 
model since it contradicts the reference point effect (as we have interpreted it), and 
the reference point effect is essential to the psychological model in a way that loss 
function concavity is not. Nevertheless, this test must take a back seat to the 
concavity/convexity tests, since the psychological model has been rather silent on the 
effects of changing endowments and any prediction must be inferred from the 
literature rather than read directly.  
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Table 1. List of Experiments 
Expt. Subject Group N Endowment CD Elicited for: 
1 Undergraduate students 37 3 mugs 1, 2, 3 mugs 
2 PTA 10 3 mugs 1, 2, 3 mugs 
3 PTA 25 3 mugs 1, 2, 3 mugs 
4 Parents of Swim Club 52 4 mugs 1, 2, 3 mugs 
5 PTA 20 4 mugs 1, 2, 3 mugs 
6 "Mothers of Multiples" 18 1 flashlight 1 flashlight 
3 different mugs 1, 2, 3 mugs 
7 Parents of Cub Scouts 30 1 mug 1 mug 
3 flashlights 1, 2, 3 flashlights 
8 Lions’ Club 42 1 mug 1 mug 
3 flashlights 1, 2, 3 flashlights 
9 PTA 40 1 mug 1 mug 
3 mugs 2, 3 mugs 
10 PTA 27 1 mug 1 mug 
3 flashlights 2, 3 flashlights 
11 PTA 27 1 flashlight 1 flashlight 
3 mugs 2, 3 mugs 
12 PTA 58 1 mug 1 mug 
3 binoculars* 2, 3 binoculars* 
(*Eight subjects received flashlights instead of binocs.) 
13 PTA 50 1 mug 1 mug 
3 flashlights 2, 3 flashlights 
 
